Excellent points everyone. And as I always expect with this question, there is a wide divergence in the opinions of all of you. Let me push you all to think a bit further, before I give my feedback to the question and your responses. Fortunately, we have three days for each theme now as I mentioned in the News Forum.
1. I asked you all whether there is a distinction between human rights and legal rights. And in this context, I want you all to consider the provisions of UDHR. Now, we know that the UDHR is an essential component of the International Bill of Human Rights (along with the ICCPR and ICESCR). There is universal acceptance that rights mentioned in the UDHR are human rights. Yet, not all those human rights are legally enforceable before many courts around the world. For instance, right to work, food, health, etc. are considered human rights in the UDHR, but are not justiciable in courts in most countries (including some developed ones like the US). Would this mean that because these rights are not legal rights (i.e. they cannot be enforced before courts in most parts of the world), they are not human rights either? If they are still human rights (the UDHR says so, after all), does it mean then that there must be some distinction between human rights and legal rights?
Moreover, note that this is not only a question of an arguably non-binding UDHR. Let us now consider the ICESCR, a legally binding treaty. Remember that most States have ratified the ICESCR, which is a binding treaty, yet hardly a hand few of those States have made its provisions legally enforceable before domestic courts! For instance, in most countries, right to health, food or work is not legally enforceable before domestic courtes, unless they can be invoked through some civil rights such as right to life. So, these States have internationally agreed that they are bound by ICESCR human rights, but have not given enforcement mechanisms through courts to their citizens. Now, just because these courts are not available to their citizens, does it mean that these norms are not human rights?
I am gonna pick out one comment by Aram for pushing everyone to delve deeper into this. He pointed out to the most important conclusion from Nickel's article. Nickel says, “Legal enforcement is generally important to making rights effective, but is not essential to the existence of rights”. So what does this mean for RtD then?
2. My second follow up question was whether there are mechanisms other than courts to hold States accountable for violations. This is an important question because under the idea of human rights, not only do human beings have human rights, but States have corresponding obligations as well. If States cannot be made accountable in any way for non-fulfillment of those obligations, then one may legitimately argue that those norms are not really human rights but only aspirational goals. Therefore, we need to look into whether courts are the only accountability mechanisms possible for States. Any answer in the negative will mean that we need not treat legal enforceability before courts as decisive of whether a norm is a human right or not! Francisco rightly mentioned the 'free' public opinion as an alternatively accountability mechanism. Aram also mentioned international pressure. We can develop both these answers even further. I will surely go deeper into this in my follow up feedback, but first, i want to push you all to think more about other forms of accountability.